The State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
The State of Utah v. Steven Ray Allen : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert N. Parrish; Christine F. Soltis; assistants Utah attorney general; attorney for appellee.
Eric P. Swenson, Michael H. Wray; attorneys for appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Allen, No. 900156.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2934







IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Docket No. 900156 
Priority No. 2 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Robert N. Parrish, #2530 
Christine F. Soltis 
Assistants Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 
Eric P. Swenson, #3171 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2843 
Michael H. Wray #4944 
9 Exchange Place, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 359-2230 
Attorneys for the State of Utah Attorneys for Appellant 
> 
JUL 1 2 1991 
CLERK SUPREME COURT. 
UTAH 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Docket No. 900156 
Priority No, 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPEAL FROM THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT, GRAND COUNTY, STATE 
OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE BOYD BUNNELL, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Eric P. Swenson, #3171 
P.O. Box 940 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Telephone: (801) 587-2843 
Robert N. Parrish, #2530 
Christine F. Soltis 
Assistants Utah Attorney General Michael H. Wray #4944 
236 State Capitol 9 Exchange Place, #900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-1015 Telephone: (801) 359-2230 
Attorneys for the State of Utah Attorneys for Appellant 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES PAGE 
Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.C. 1246 (1991) 2, 3, 4 
Barber v. State, 576 So.2d 825 (Florida App. 1991) . . . . 8 
Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) 4 
Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683 (1986) 8 
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) 3, 5 
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) 9, 10 
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) 2 
Layton City v. Aragon 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Utah App. 
1991) 11 
Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963) 6 
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 111 S.Ct. 2204 (1991) 9, 10 
Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990) 9 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) 7, 9 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 110 S.C. 2638 (1990) 8 
Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) 6 
State v. Carter, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 32 (Utah App. 1991) 
6, 7, 11, 13 
State v. Hackford, 737 P.2d 200 (Utah 1987) 5 
State v. Hamons, 805 P.2d 6 (Kan. 1991) 10 
State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990) 3 
State v. Ramirez, 159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991) 
11, 12, 13 
State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah App. 1991). . . 10, 11 
State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah App. 1991 7, 13 
State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) 3 
State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1989) 3, 5 
State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991) 12 
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) 2 
United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1991) 6, 7 
Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) 2 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, ] 
v. 
STEVEN RAY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Appellant, ] 
> Docket No. 900156 
i Priority No. 2 
APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
INTRODUCTION 
This Supplemental Brief addresses issues raised in the trial 
court and in the original brief, highlighting recent cases not 
previously available to Appellant at the time of the preparation of 
the brief. The arguments raised in this Supplemental Brief center 
only on Point Two, as to the admission of the Defendant's 
statements, and will follow the headings of the original brief. 
Thereafter, the regular briefing schedule will then commence as to 
the filing of Appellee's brief and Appellant's reply brief. 
POINT TWO 
ALLOWING DEFENDANTS STATEMENTS TO 
LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS WAS ERROR 
A. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS, WHICH 
WERE NOT VOLUNTARY, WAS ERROR 
In Arizona v. Fulminante. Ill S.Ct. 1246 (1991), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the admission of an involuntary 
confession in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clause is subject to a harmless-error analysis. The court reasoned 
that the admission of a coerced confession belongs to the same 
category of trial error similar in degree to the erroneous 
admission of other types of evidence. Also an involuntary 
statement is not the type of error which transcends the criminal 
process, and that the possible dramatic effect of coerced 
statements at a trial is not such as to justify eschewing the 
harmless-error test. 
Fulminante contrasts with other cases in which the Supreme 
Court has held that a constitutional error automatically requires 
reversal of a conviction. Gideon v. Wainwriqht, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963) (Deprivation of right to counsel at trial); Tumey v. Ohio. 
273 U.S. 510 (1927) (Biased Trial Judge) and, Vasquez v. Hillery, 
474 U.S. 254 (1986) (Exclusion of members of Defendant's race from 
Grand Jury). Fulminante, an opinion fractured by concurring and 
dissenting opinions, reasoned that there were two groups of 
constitutional errors deserving of separate standards of review. 
The two groups are identified as first, those involving matters 
which amount to a structural defect affecting the framework within 
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which the trial proceeds, such as the lack of counsel problem in 
Gideon, as opposed to the second category, which concerns errors in 
the trial process itself. The Fulminante case also involved a 
dispute as to whether and upon what terms a coerced confession's 
admission at trial would be "harmless". On these and other issues, 
the varied opinions stressed the often conflicting federal case 
law. Contrast, Fulminante, Part I, II, & III, at 1250-1253 
(Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, and Scalia), with Part II, 
at 1253-1257 (Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens & White). 
This Court has used the harmless-error standard in regards to 
federal constitutional issues. State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1203, 
1213 (Utah 1989), (Hypnotic testimony and the right of 
confrontation), citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 
(1986) . The Court in Tuttle did not use the analysis found in 
Fulminante. And no other Utah decision has reviewed the harmless-
error question in regards to coerced statements using the 
Fulminante reasoning. Although Appellant's original brief had used 
the harmless-error standard, Fulminante now illustrates the extent 
to which it would be impractical to continue the use of this often 
contradictory guideline. Since Appellant's trial, this Court has 
issued a number of decisions emphasizing the greater extent of 
Utah's Constitutional protection over that offered under the 
federal rules. See, e.g., State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 
1990) (Auto searches), and State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 
1991) (Seizure of bank records). The analysis used in Larocco, 
that a confusing and contradictory federal standard may justify a 
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departure to a more evenly applied rule under Utah's Constitution, 
provides ample justification for the Court to now impose a stricter 
standard. This standard should be that the use of a coerced 
statement must require a reversal, regardless of whether the error 
could be construed as harmless. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court uses the harmless-error 
standard, Appellant contends that the use of his statements should 
not be construed as harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, mindful of 
the fact that the Supreme Court ruled that the use of the 
Fulminante confession was in fact not harmless error. In so 
holding, the Court, at 1257, quoted from a dissenting opinion from 
an earlier case, which said, "Certainly, confessions have profound 
impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably doubt its 
ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so". Bruton v. 
United States. 391 U.S. 123, 140 (1968) (Justice White, 
dissenting). The Court went on to note the risks of reliability 
inherent in coerced statements which, when coupled with the 
statement's profound impact on a jury, "...requires a reviewing 
court to exercise extreme caution before determining that the 
admission of the confession at trial was harmless". Fulminante, at 
1258. And, the Court held, again at 1258, that the State has the 
burden of establishing, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
admission of the confession was harmless error. 
The use of Mr. Allen's statements was anything but harmless. 
In Fulminante. at 1259-1260, an important factor used by the Court 
was the extent to which the other evidence supporting guilt weighed 
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in comparison with the impact defendant's confession had on the 
jury's verdict, and concluded that the remaining and largely 
circumstantial evidence standing alone would not have been 
sufficient to convict. Utah similarly requires that "...an error 
is harmless if the overwhelming evidence of guilt makes it unlikely 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the result would have been different 
absent the error". State v. Tuttle. 780 P.2d 1203, 1213 (Utah 
1989), citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, supra. Mr. Allen's 
statements are certainly not harmless under this standard. 
Appellant's original brief attacked the largely circumstantial 
evidence. This included the early abuse acts, the lack of medical 
findings as to cause and manner of death, and the weak, superficial 
inferences drawn from such evidence as the contents of a destroyed 
diary, and the prejudicial use of the child's autopsy photographs. 
These problems lead to a doubt, certainly reasonable, that the 
State's case, standing alone as a package without the support of 
defendant's admissions, would not be sufficient to muster a 
conviction. State v. Tuttle, supra, at 1213; And, see State v. 
Hackford, 737 P.2d 200, 204 (Utah 1987) (Reversal required only if 
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the 
accused had the error not occurred). 
A recent case supports Appellant's contention that when the 
Attorney General's investigator deliberately failed to read to the 
Defendant the waiver portion of the Miranda form, that this act 
deceived Mr. Allen to the extent that there was no effective waiver 
of his right to remain silent, and that accordingly any statements 
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he made were involuntary. United States v. Anderson. 929 F.2d 96, 
100-101 (2nd Cir. 1991). The factual setting condemned in this 
case concerned an agent's warnings to a subject that a request for 
an attorney would prevent the defendant's cooperation at a later 
date, thereby losing the opportunity to win favorable treatment 
from the government. The Court held, at 100, that "affirmative 
misrepresentations by the police may be sufficiently coercive to 
invalidate a suspect's waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege", 
citing Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534-535 (1963), and Spano 
v. New York. 360 U.S. 315, 322-323 (1959). Officer Hines' conduct 
meets the standard used in these cases. He testified he rushed to 
Montana to interrogate Allen, and to avoid "jail contaminance", 
(sic) i.e., prisoner advice to contact lawyers. Suppression 
Hearing, Tr. 34. He also acknowledged that his not reading 
suspects the waiver portion of his Miranda form was standard 
practice. This routine enabled him to place little emphasis on the 
waiver language, lulling Allen into talking. Concealing these 
rights was more effective than actually misstating the rule. This 
conduct surely reaches the level of "affirmative 
misrepresentations" disapproved of in United States v. Anderson, 
supra. 
Recent case law also supports Appellant's argument that his 
illegal arrest in Idaho, his removal to Montana, and the beating he 
received in the process was not attenuated to the point where his 
subsequent statements would be admissible. United States v. 
Anderson, supra, and State v. Carter, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 36-37 
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(Utah App. 1991). Carter involved the question of the taint of an 
illegal detention upon a subsequent consent. The Court listed, at 
36, four factors to consider when determining whether the consent 
was obtained as a result of an exploitation of a prior illegality, 
which include: (1) Miranda warnings, (2), the passage of time, (3), 
presence of intervening circumstances, and (4) , the flagrancy of 
the illegality. These considerations would apply in Mr. Allen's 
situation. State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141, 150-151 (Utah App. 1991). 
In Sims, at 151, the Court held that the burden was on the State to 
prove that evidence obtained following illegal police conduct was 
attenuated from that illegality. Sims also held that an 
examination of the flagrancy of the primary police illegality was 
in order even though this factor is unrelated to other factors 
under consideration, and that the flagrancy of the conduct alone 
could merit imposition of constitutional sanctions. Sims, supra, at 
151. 
And, in United States v. Anderson, supra, at 101, the Court 
noted that "...the use of coercive and improper tactics in 
obtaining an initial confession may warrant a presumption of 
compulsion as to a second one, even if the latter was obtained 
after properly administered Miranda warnings", citing Oregon v. 
Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 314 (1985). And, closely paralleling Mr. 
Allen's situation, the Court in Anderson commented that the 
interrogating agent made no effort to dispel the original threats. 
The Court concluded, at 102, that suppression of the statements 
served two purposes: "It operates as a disincentive for police to 
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coerce a confession by threatening a defendant with false and/or 
misleading statements. The fact-finding process is also enhanced 
since a confession obtained in the manner this one was may be 
untrustworthy". 
Appellant also claims that the trial Courtfs refusal to allow 
the jury to listen to the tape recording of the events of the 
arrest and the abuse suffered by Mr. Allen at the hands of the 
arresting officers, which pertained to the issue of the 
voluntariness of his later statements, violates his due process and 
Sixth Amendment fair trial protection. Crane v. Kentucky. 476 U.S. 
683 (1986). A recent Florida case supports this contention. Barber 
v. State, 576 So.2d 825 (Florida App. 1991). 
Barber involved a defense request to play an interrogation 
tape, not for the truthfulness of the statements made by the 
Defendant, but to allow jurors to gauge the extent to which the 
suspect's speech reflected intoxication which in turn was critical 
as to the issue of homicidal intent. The Court reasoned that while 
a self serving declaration would be hearsay, it could be offered 
for some other reason, so long as it was material to some issue in 
the case. And the Court said: "Because of the trial court's ruling, 
the jury was deprived of a means of assessing appellant's defense 
that he was too intoxicated to formulate the intent required for 
first degree murder". Barber, supra, at 830-831. The Court also 
referred to a recent U.S. Supreme Court case, Pennsylvania v. 
Muniz, 110 S.Ct. 2638 (1990), which held that the State could 
introduce a videotaping of a DUI suspect's speech and actions 
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without running afoul of constitutional limitations. These recent 
authorities support Appellant's contention that the court committed 
error in not allowing the jury to hear the arrest tape on the issue 
of whether his statements were voluntary. 
B. ALLOWING THE STATEMENTS ABSENT 
COMPLIANCE WITH THE MIRANDA 
REQUIREMENTS WAS ERROR 
In McNeil v. Wisconsin. Ill S.Ct. 2204 (1991), the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently analyzed the difference between the Fifth 
and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution when 
considering whether a suspect has invoked his right to counsel. 
The Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was "case 
specific", and that an invocation as to questioning as to one crime 
does not, under the standards of Oregon v. Elstad, Supra. Minnick 
v. Mississippi, 111 S.Ct. 486 (1990), and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 
U.S. 477 (1981), prevent a police officer from later interrogating 
the subject as to a different offense so long as they comply with 
the Fifth Amendment-Miranda rules. 
Mr. Allen's situation involved a quick and turbulent exchange 
as to the law between himself and Sheriff Printz' deputies. One 
officer began but did not finish reading the Miranda rights. 
Arrest Transcript. Tr. 3. A violent encounter ensued, and Allen 
screamed "Read my rights", and said "I ain't supposed to say 
nothing". Tr. 5. Another officer later followed up on that by 
telling the subject: "Hay, you're just lucky you're not dead. We 
could have done it the easy way and just popped ya. Saved the 
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county a lot of money to try your ass. You know it?". Tr. 8. 
Appellant claims that he again invoked his right to counsel at the 
Ravelli county jail and later during interrogation. However, 
Messrs. Printz and Hines claim Allen only mentioned an attorney at 
the end of their questioning, and then only in regards to a 
discussion about extradition. Motions Hearing, Tr. 29, 67. These 
events and the colloquy between suspect and police, even assuming 
the truth of the officer's version of the post-arrest events, 
constitute an invocation. 
In McNeil v. Wisconsin, supra, at 2209, the Court stated that 
an adversarial relationship between suspect and interrogator 
attached as a result of a pending prosecution, thereby requiring 
Sixth Amendment protection. See, also, State v. Hamons, 805 P.2d 
6, 11 (Kan. 1991). And, in State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d 1100 (Utah 
App. 1991), the court considered invocation questions without 
distinguishing between the Sixth Amendment and Fifth Amendment 
considerations found in the McNeil case. Sampson held that once 
there was an equivocal request for counsel, this request could not 
be ignored, at 1114-1116, regardless of the language in Edwards, 
supra, at 484-485, that the right must be "clearly asserted". 
Accordingly, the Sampson court held, at 1114, that the officers 
must only take actions to clarify the request, and that an 
equivocal request must be treated in that regard as one which was 
unambiguous. The ruling in Sampson contrasts with the situation in 
Mr. Allen's case, where there was no clarification. Indeed, the 
opposite occurred, when Mr. Hines deceived the Defendant by not 
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reading the waiver portion of the Miranda form. And, in a ruling 
that has great significance for Appellant's situation, Sampson, at 
1114, held that "Neither the passage of time, however great, nor 
the administration of additional Miranda warnings will allow 
officers to reconvene interrogation absent clarification". 
D. THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CON-
CONCLUSIONS WERE INADEQUATE 
This Court recently further addressed the problem of 
inadequate findings of fact in the trial court. State v. Ramirez, 
159 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (Utah 1991). Ramirez dealt with factual 
issues as to a search and seizure question the resolution of which 
was a necessary prerequisite to the admission of eyewitness 
identification testimony. The Court held that search and seizure 
issues were highly fact sensitive, that detailed findings are 
necessary for meaningful appellate review, that there is an 
assumption supporting the trial court's decision, that this 
assumption would be inappropriate if there was unresolved evidence 
as to a factual issue, and that accordingly the appropriate remedy 
if the evidence was ambiguous would be a reversal of the conviction 
and the remanding of the case for a new trial. Ramirez, supra, at 
15. 
Miranda issues are likewise highly fact sensitive. See, e.g., 
Layton City v. Aragon, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. 44, 46 (Utah App. 1991); 
State v. Carter, supra, at 36, 39. And while the trial court's 
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decision as to these issues are questions of fact, they also 
involve questions of law that this Court should accord no 
particular deference. State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991). 
In denying Appellant's Suppression Motion, the Court made certain 
comments at the conclusion of Mr. Allen's suppression hearing. 
See, Appendix Number II, Appellant's Brief. Appellant's initial 
brief identified instances where these comments were mere 
conclusions, or where they could be construed as findings, failed 
to address crucial facts adequate to resolve many of the issues of 
law raised by the defense. 
For instance, one important contention by Appellant is that 
his arrest in Idaho by Montana law officers and removal back to 
Montana was unlawful, thereby tainting any subsequent evidence that 
may have been obtained from him, including his statements. Ramirez 
dealt with a similar issue in the context of an unlawful seizure 
which lead to an eyewitness identification. Ramirez. supra, at 15. 
The reversal in Ramirez came about because the trial court failed 
to resolve ambiguities in the arresting officers' versions of their 
encounter with the suspect which were crucial in determining 
whether defendant's seizure was lawful. In Mr. Allen's case, the 
Court's comments at the conclusion of the suppression hearing 
centered on compliance with Miranda requirements, waiver of the 
right to remain silent, the credibility of the witnesses, and other 
matters. However, the Court never stated facts focusing on the 
officers' intrusion into Idaho's jurisdiction and performing an 
impromptu extradition without benefit of legal process, or 
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resolving the impact that this situation may have had on the 
Defendant's subsequent interrogation. 
Still another shortcoming in the "findings" dealt with the 
failure of the trial court to resolve the ambiguities in officer 
Hines' testimony. Mr. Hines assured the Court that he and Sheriff 
Printz had fully informed Mr. Allen of the Miranda rights and 
offered him every opportunity to obtain legal counsel, which the 
Court apparently accepts in its statement denying the motion, See, 
Appendix II, supra. However, the Court did not consider officer 
Hines1 conflicting admission that he had read Allen only portions 
of the Miranda form, thereby omitting the critical "waiver of 
rights" language. Nor did the Court address with Mr. Hines1 
admission that he had intentionally not shown Allen the entire form 
or obtained his signature thereon. See, Plaintiff's Exhibit Number 
Seven; Suppression Motion, Tr. 38-39; Trial, Tr 596-598; 614-616. 
The failure to analyze and resolve these factual conflicts is a 
shortcoming which certainly violates the standards set forth in 
Ramirez. 
And finally, this Court should compare the attenuation 
standards set out in State v. Carter, supra, with the language of 
the trial court's ruling. Few facts were discussed by the court as 
to what may have occurred in the jail or during the interrogation 
which dissipated the taint of the abuse Mr. Allen suffered during 
his arrest, a critical issue under such cases as State v. Sims, 
supra. This defect should be resolved by sending the case back to 
the trial court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in Appellant's original brief, and this 
Supplemental Brief, Mr. Allen's conviction should be reversed, and 
a new trial ordered. 
DATED this 11th day of July, 1991. 
Eric P. Swenson 
jfiULjd. 
Michael H. Wray 
Attorneys for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned counsel for Appellant hereby affirms and 
certifies that he did mail four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to the Office of the Utah Attorney General, addressed to 
Robert N. Parrish and Christine F. Soltis, at 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114, this 12th day of July, 1991. 
DATED this 12th day of July, 1991. 
By : /?KLJ^< 
Eric P. Swenson 
Michael H. Wray 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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